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Abstract
A fundamental trait of the human self is its continuum experience of space and time. Perceptual aberrations of this spatial
and temporal continuity is a major characteristic of schizophrenia spectrum disturbances – including schizophrenia,
schizotypal personality disorder and schizotypy. We have previously found the classical Perceptual Aberration Scale (PAS)
scores, related to body and space, to be positively correlated with both behavior and temporo-parietal activation in healthy
participants performing a task involving self-projection in space. However, not much is known about the relationship
between temporal perceptual aberration, behavior and brain activity. To this aim, we composed a temporal Perceptual
Aberration Scale (tPAS) similar to the traditional PAS. Testing on 170 participants suggested similar performance for PAS and
tPAS. We then correlated tPAS and PAS scores to participants’ performance and neural activity in a task of self-projection in
time. tPAS scores correlated positively with reaction times across task conditions, as did PAS scores. Evoked potential
mapping and electrical neuroimaging showed self-projection in time to recruit a network of brain regions at the left anterior
temporal cortex, right temporo-parietal junction, and occipito-temporal cortex, and duration of activation in this network
positively correlated with tPAS and PAS scores. These data demonstrate that schizotypal perceptual aberrations of both
time and space, as reflected by tPAS and PAS scores, are positively correlated with performance and brain activation during
self-projection in time in healthy individuals along the schizophrenia spectrum.
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Introduction
A fundamental trait of the human self is the continuous mental
projection to different points in time in order to re-experience past
events and predict future occurrences [1,2,3]. This is related on
cognitive functions including episodic memory [4], future
prediction [5,6] visual imagery [7] and ‘‘mental time travel’’ [8].
The projection of the self along time allows the self to act as
‘‘observer, agent, and guardian of the continuity of experience’’
[9] (p. 161). Continuity of the self in space is also fundamental for
human cognition, and mental ‘‘projection’’ of the self to the so-
called ‘‘third person perspective’’ is essential for cognitive functions
such as agency, self–other distinction, and mental own-body
imagery [10,11,12,13]. The similarity between this magnitudes of
space and time with respect to the experiencing self has been
recently stressed [14,15]. Disturbances in this spatial and temporal
unity of the self is a major characteristic of schizophrenia spectrum
disorders – including schizophrenia, schizotypal personality
disorder and schizotypy [16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26]. Ac-
cordingly, high frequency of spontaneously experienced schizoty-
pal perceptual aberrations with respect to body and space, as
measured by the Perceptual Aberration Scale (PAS) [27], have
been considered an indicator of psychosis-proneness [28,29,30]. In
view of this, we have previously found PAS scores to be positively
correlated with behavior and duration of temporo-parietal
activation in participants performing a task involving self-
projection in space [25,31], in agreement with other neuroimaging
studies, showing higher temporo-parietal activity during space-
related tasks (such as agency or visual perspective taking)
[24,31,32,33,34]. However, not much is known about perceptual
aberrations in time in people along the schizophrenia spectrum, as
well as the relationship between these ‘‘temporal’’ perceptual
aberrations and neural activity [35,36].
To this aim, we first composed a temporal Perceptual
Aberration Scale (tPAS; Table 1) similar to the abovementioned
PAS scale [37,38]. The tPAS was, secondly, tested in a large group
of 170 healthy participants. We thirdly compared tPAS and PAS
scores to participants’ performance in a smaller group of 14
participants performing a self-projection in time task, as reported
previously [3], and fourthly, compared tPAS and PAS scores to
participants’ brain activity as measured by electrical neuroimaging
during task performance. The task asked participants to imagine
themselves at three different time-points: Now (the present time-
point), Past (10 years earlier than the present time-point), or Future
(10 years later). In separate blocks for the Now, Past, and Future
time-points, participants were shown a series of different events
(personal (e.g. first child) or non-personal (e.g. Obama’s election)
on a computer screen. They were asked to indicate if the presented
event took place before (Backwards in time) or after (Forward in
time) the currently imagined time-point. Accordingly, we labelled
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to past, now or future points was labelled absolute self projection
(Figure 1A). Regarding our previous results showing positive
correlation between PAS scores and behaviour and brain activity
in self-projection in space, as well as the similarity between self
projection in time and space [1,3,12,15,23,31], we hypothesized
that performance and brain activity in this self-projection in time
task will be correlated with level of spontaneously experienced
schizotypal perceptual aberrations in space and time as measured
by PAS and tPAS scores.
Results
Behavioural testing of the temporal Perceptual
Aberration Scale (tPAS)
Analysis of results obtained from the 170 participants for the
whole sample showed a significant positive correlation between
PAS and tPAS scores (r=0.57, p,0.001, two-tailed). This suggests
that participants performed similarly in the PAS and tPAS. The
same correlation conducted for women and men separately
showed this correlation to be evident for each sex (men: r=0.54,
p,0.001; women: r=0.60, p,0.001). Independent t-tests showed
that neither the mean tPAS score, nor the mean PAS score
differed (tPAS: t168=1.10, p=0.27, PAS: t168=1.65, p=0.10)
between women (tPAS: 4.5561.27, PAS: 6.4965.58) and men
(tPAS: 4.3561.19, PAS: 5.2963.75).
tPAS and PAS Questionnaires
Mean tPAS score for the electrical neuroimaging group was
4.061.3. PAS score of 5.562.1 was comparable to those reported
in previous studies [25,27,31,39]. tPAS and PAS scores were
found to be correlated to each other (r=0.72, p,0.01).
Task performance and questionnaire scores
Reaction times in the time task were significantly longer for Past
(mean6SD: 475.36137.1 ms) and Future (480.16154.1 ms) than
Now (401.16159.2 ms) events (F(2,26)=12.5 p,0.001; Figure 1B)
[3,40]. tPAS scores correlated positively with reaction times across
task conditions (r=0.69, p,0.01), as did the PAS scores (r=0.68,
p,0.01; Figure 2A). With regard to accuracy, participants’ error
rates were higher in the Past and Future conditions than in the
Now condition (mean error rates: 9.265.2% (Past); 6.163.1%
(Now); 9.864.5% (Future); F(2,26)=7.2, p,0.01). Accuracy rates
did not correlate with either tPAS scores (r=0.16, p=0.54) or
with PAS scores (r=0.09, p=0.79).
EP mapping and source localization
EP mapping of the group-averaged data revealed one microstate
of brain activation (time segment of stable voltage topography; EP
map) that lasted significantly longer for the Past (110.2612.3 ms)
and Future (105.0615.2 ms) conditions than the Now
(39.268.4 ms) condition as reported previously (F(2,26)=3.8,
p=0.03; Figure 1C) [3], comparable to the behavioural data
pattern, suggesting that this EP map is linked to self-projection in
time (time-map). No difference was found when statistical analysis
was performed on the amplitude (or GFP) of those EP maps
(F(2,26)=0.6; p=0.56). A linear inverse solution (LAURA) [41]
localized the time-map to the left anterior temporal cortex, right
temporo-parietaljunction,andoccipito-temporalcortex(Figure1D)
[40].
Table 1. Temporal Perceptual Aberrations Scale (tPAS).
Statement
1. I sometimes have the feeling that I have already been in a situation like the one I am currently in (de ´ja ` ve ´cu).
2. I sometimes re-imagine experiences I had in the past.
3. I dedicate much time to planning my schedule.
4. I sometimes have the feeling of having already seen things that are presented to me (de ´ja ` vu).
5. I sometimes find myself dreaming awake.
6. I sometimes look upon myself from a future point of view.
7. I sometimes imagine myself as a younger child.
8. I sometimes have a dream in which I meet my past self.
9. I sometimes have a dream in which I meet my future self.
10. I sometimes think deeply about my old age.
11. I sometimes know what to do as I already predicted such a situation without previously experiencing it.
12. I sometimes feel that I am older than my current age.
13. I sometimes feel that I am younger than my current age.
14. I sometimes have the feeling that I know what is going to happen.
15. I sometimes regret key decisions I took in my life.
16. I am sometimes bothered by key decisions I have to make in the far future.
17. I sometimes believe that patterns or situations that have already happened will re-occur again.
18. I am sometimes not sure if some events had really occurred to me or were just imagined.
19. I sometimes feel sure when performing an action, although I have never done it before.
20. I am sometimes not sure if I did something that I had already done.
The 20-item tPAS scale, which was developed for measuring the frequency of schizotypal perceptual aberrations of time, is presented. Participants had to rate on a scale
from 1 to 10 how much these statements are true with respect to themselves, based on their own experiences (1 - not at all; 10 – very much).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016154.t001
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Correlation analysis of tPAS and PAS scores with the duration
of the time-map for each subject revealed significant positive
correlations (tPAS: r=0.59, p,0.05; PAS: r=0.58, p,0.05;
Figure 2B), comparable to the relationship between behavioral
reaction times and tPAS and PAS scores. Neither tPAS nor PAS
scores were significantly correlated with the strength (or GFP) of
the time-map (tPAS: r=0.44, p=0.11; PAS: r=0.43, p=0.12).
The duration or the amplitude of no other EP map, before and
after the time-map, showed a significant correlation with these
scores. These data suggest that during the self-projection in time
task, the duration, but not amplitude (GFP) of neural activation, in
a specific time period (,350–500 ms after stimulus onset), within a
network including left anterior temporal cortex, right temporo-
parietal junction, and occipito-temporal cortex, is positively
correlated with schizotypal symptomatology, specifically temporal
and spatial perceptual aberrations as measured by tPAS and PAS
scores, respectively. These data suggest that schizotypal perceptual
aberrations of time and space are positively correlated with
behavioral performance and neural activation during a self-
projection in time task.
Discussion
Time, space and schizotypy
Impairment of self- and spatial-processing is a prominent
characteristic of disorders along the schizophrenia spectrum
[17,19,21,22,24,26,27,33,42,43,44,45]. However, although similar
Figure 1. Experimental design and results. (A). Stimuli and procedure. The three different self-projections in time (past, now, and future) are
shown. Participants were asked to mentally ‘‘project’’ themselves to one of these time-points, and from these time-points to judge whether different
self or nonself events (e.g., top row) already happened (relative past) or are yet to happen (relative future). (B) Behavioral data. Reaction times are
plotted separately for past (blue), now (red), and future (green) self-projections in time. Note the significantly higher results for past and future with
respect to the now. (C) From all EP maps, only one ‘‘time-map’’ was found to be significantly longer for past and future than for the now. Topography
and duration of this map for the three experimental conditions is shown. (D) Generators of the ‘‘time-map’’ were localized to the right
temporoparietal, occipitotemporal, and left anterior temporal cortices.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016154.g001
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self over time [23], such temporal aspects of self-processing have
received little empirical attention in schizophrenia. Specifically,
while several studies investigated temporal processing in the
seconds or minutes range [46,47,48,49,50,51], almost no attention
was paid to longer time periods. However, disturbances of time
consciousness in schizophrenia are not restricted to short time
scales, but appear to also involve binding together experiences
from one’s personal history over a time scale of years [52], often
referred to as ‘autonoetic awareness’ [8,52,53]. In a study to test
the hypothesis that patients with schizophrenia are unable to link
the separate aspects of events into a cohesive, memorable, and
distinctive whole, it was shown that such patients exhibited an
impaired recognition memory and a reduction in frequency of
autonoetic awareness relative to a control group [54]. A more
recent study found that patients with positive symptoms of
schizophrenia recalled fewer specific past events than did healthy
controls and were even more impaired in generating specific future
events [36]. Although not directly tested, these authors speculated
that such schizophrenic patients’ failures to process past and future
episodes might be related to disturbance of the sense of ‘‘subjective
time’’ in these patients, as well as to difficulties in episodic
memory, which has been assumed to be disturbed in schizophre-
nia [55,56,57,58,59]. The present data demonstrate that perfor-
mance and brain activation in a task of self-in-time positively
correlated not only with the degree of spatial perceptual
aberrations as reflected by PAS scores [25,31], but also with
temporal perceptual aberrations as reflected by tPAS scores. These
findings are in line with recent proposals that self-projection in
space and time share similar brain mechanisms [1,3,15].
Our EP data also showed that participants with higher tPAS
and PAS scores took longer to respond in a task involving self-
projection in time, and activated the right temporo-parietal
junction, the left anterior temporal lobe and the occipito-temporal
cortex bilaterally for a longer time. This is also in agreement with
studies of patients with schizophrenia revealing impairment in
temporo-parietal junction activity related to self-processing
[16,34,60,61]. Moreover, this activity was found to be positively
Figure 2. Correlations between reaction times, brain activation, and temporal and spatial perceptual aberration scale (tPAS, PAS)
scores. (A) tPAS and PAS scores as a function of reaction times in the self-in-time task. (B) tPAS and PAS scores as a function of duration of activation
of the time-map as measured by electrical neuroimaging. Note that this correlation parallels the correlation between the behavioral results and the
tPAS and PAS scores.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016154.g002
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However, whereas earlier studies suggested that pathological
temporo-parietal junction activity was due to changes in strength
of activation, the present data suggest that increased temporo-
parietal junction activity was due to longer, but not stronger
temporo-parietal junction activation [31].
The current findings may be explained by several neural
mechanisms that have been put forward to account for prolonged
brain activation patterns. David et al. [62] proposed that increases
in duration of activation may depend on the increased
contribution of top–down connections, reflecting re-entry of
neural signals to lower-level processing areas, as EPs were found
to be more enduring and dispersed in higher level areas [62]. This
is particularly true with respect to late EP components [62], like
the time-map that we found for the time period between 350 and
500 ms after stimulus presentation. The prolonged activity found
in the present study might thus reflect atypical processing in a
network of brain regions at the anterior temporal, temporo-
parietal and occipito-temporal cortex related to altered top–down
signals in subjects with high schizotypy scores. Alternatively,
prolonged activation at these regions may also be due to an
increase of independent simultaneous brain processes and/or
degraded functional connectivity between these regions
[63,64,65].
Schizotypal perceptual aberrations of space and time
and their neural mechanisms
Our data suggest that the relative impairment in self-projection
in time in healthy participants scoring high on positive schizotypy
may be related to atypical processing within the described
network. It has been proposed that brain function might be
broadly divided into an ‘extrinsic’ system, processing stimuli
delivered from the external environment, and ‘intrinsic’ system,
related to mental processing of one’s body and self
[26,66,67,68,69,70,71]. This latter system is overlapping with
the neural network found here for self-projection in time [66,72].
It was hypothesized that a major role of the intrinsic system is
simulation of one’s probable future, through episodic thinking and
comparison of past memories and future predictions
[8,68,73,74,75]. Research on schizophrenia and schizotypy has
found as well aberrations in processing of past memories and
future predictions: patients with schizophrenia have been shown to
exhibit impaired recognition memory and a reduction in
frequency of autonoetic awareness suggesting an impairment in
linking the separate aspects of events into a cohesive, memorable,
and distinctive processing of subjective time in schizophrenia [54].
The current data refine these findings further by showing
significant and coherent variability in self-projection in time to
past and future in individuals along the schizophrenia spectrum.
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that self-
projection in time as reflected by behavioral measures as well as
duration of activation in a network of brain regions including left
anteroior temporal, the right temporo-parietal and bilateral
occipito-temporal cortex, are positively correlated with degree of
schizotypy, as measured by tPAS and PAS scores. These results
suggest that individuals with increased levels of schizotypy are
relatively impaired in self-relevant processing of space and time.
Materials and Methods
Questionnaires
Participants completed the 20-item tPAS scale (Table 1), which
was developed for measuring the frequency of schizotypal
perceptual aberrations of time. Typical items of the tPAS scale
are ‘‘I sometimes re-imagine experiences I had in the past’’ and ‘‘I
sometimes have the feeling that I know what is going to happen’’.
Participants had to rate on a scale from 1 to 10 how much these
statements are true with respect to themselves, based on their own
experiences (1 – not at all; 10 – very much). In addition, they
completed the 35-item true–false self-report PAS [27]. Typical
items of the PAS are ‘‘Occasionally I have felt as though my body
did not exist’’ and ‘‘Occasionally I have the impression that one of
my body-parts is bigger than usual’’ [28,29,30]. Participants also
completed the standardized handedness questionnaire [76] and
were asked about their previous neurological or psychiatric
history.
Participants
Behavioural study: 170 healthy volunteers (85 women) aged
20.8264.62 years (mean6sd; range 18–47 years) were asked to
complete the tPAS (Table 1) and PAS questionnaire [27]. Half of
the participants were undergraduate students receiving course
credit for their participation, while the remaining participants
were undergraduate students from various faculties at the
University of Bristol, UK. The affiliation of the latter participants
remained anonymous, since each undergraduate student of the
local psychology department was only asked to recruit an
additional undergraduate student of the opposite sex in order to
balance gender differences (70% of the psychology students were
women, see also [25] for a comparable test setting). Prior to the
experiment, which was approved by the local Ethical Committee
of the University of Bristol, all participants provided written
informed consent. Testing took place in groups of 5–10 in the
classroom.
Electrical neuroimaging study: Fourteen healthy volunteers
(seven males, aged 29–38 years; 31.562.9 years) participated in
the behavioural and EEG experiment, as reported previously [3].
All participants were right handed, and had normal or corrected to
normal vision and no history of neurological or psychiatric
disorders. All participants gave written informed consent before
inclusion in the study, which was approved by the Ethical
Committee of the University Hospital of Geneva (Switzerland).
Paradigm
The present study is based on a new analysis of data previously
collected and published [3]. Only the most relevant description of
paradigm and key results is provided here. Participants were asked
to ‘‘project’’ themselves to three different time-points: now (the
present time), past (10 years in the past), or future (10 years in the
future). In separate blocks for the past, now, and future, two-word
phrases describing different common events from personal life
(e.g., driver’s license; first child) or non-personal world events (e.g.,
Challenger explosion; Obama’s elections) were presented on a
computer screen (Figure 1A). Participants were asked to indicate
whether the presented event took place before (relative past) or
after (relative future) the currently imagined time-point (Figure 1A).
Stimuli were designed to be in the range of 615 years of the
imagined time-point. Judgments were given using index and
middle fingers of the left and right hand in alternating blocks as a
button press on a serial response box. Participants were instructed
to respond as quickly and precisely as possible while maintaining a
mental image of themselves in the appropriate time-point (past,
now, or future), which were performed in six blocks (each repeated
once) and counterbalanced across subjects. Each block included
120 stimuli, equally distributed among four groups: self (personal
events) in relative past, self in relative future, non-self (world
events) in relative past, and non-self in relative future, appearing in
random order.
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Repeated measures ANOVAs were run on reaction times and
accuracy with Time (Past, Now and Future) as the repeated
measures factor. Then, to test possible relationships between
individuals’ questionnaire scores and task performance, separate
correlation analyses were performed between participants’ reac-
tion times and accuracy results and their questionnaire scores on
tPAS and PAS. These were performed for the whole sample, using
Pearson product moment correlations. All p-values are two-tailed,
and the significance level was set to a=0.05.
Electroencephalography (EEG) recording and evoked
potential (EP) mapping
Continuous EEG was acquired with a Bio-Semi system (Bio-
semi, Inc., Netherlands) from 192 scalp electrodes (impedances
,5k V; vertex referenced; 2048 Hz digitization; band-pass filtered
0.1–100 Hz) in a darkened, electrically shielded booth. Epochs of
EEG (from 0 to 800 ms post-stimulus onset) from trials yielding
correct responses were averaged for each of the three experimental
conditions (Past, Now and Future) and for each subject to calculate
the EPs [77]. In addition to the rejection of sweeps where any
channel exceeded the amplitude of 6100 mV, the data were
visually inspected to reject epochs with blinks, eye movements, or
other sources of transient noise. EPs were band-pass filtered (1–
40 Hz) and recalculated against the average reference [77]. The
192-channel EP analysis was based on the examination of the
spatial variations of the voltage distribution over time and between
conditions, an approach known as microstates EP mapping
[77,78,79,80,81,82]. This approach searches for time segments
of stable map topography that represent functional microstates of
the brain during information processing. EP microstate segments
were defined by using a spatial k-means cluster analysis to identify
the dominant map topographies in the group-averaged evoked
potentials across the experimental conditions over time. The
optimal number of these template maps is determined by a
modified cross-validation criterion [78,79,80,83]. In a second step
the presence of a given EP map as identified in the group-averaged
data was verified statistically in the EPs of the individual subjects.
EP maps were competitively fitted to the EPs of the individual
subjects. This allows determination of the duration (number of
time-points that were assigned to one microstate map) and the
amplitude (or global field power, GFP) of a given EP map for each
condition across subjects. These duration and GFP values for a
given EP map then can be subjected to statistical analysis.
Statistical comparisons were performed on the duration and GFP
of each map (dependent variable) in the individual EPs using
repeated measures ANOVAs, with Time as the repeated measures
factor. Then, to test possible relationships between individuals’
questionnaire scores and the measured brain activity, the
respective mean durations and GFP of the different EP maps for
the individual subjects were correlated with participants’ tPAS and
PAS scores. For each EP map, separate correlation analyses were
performed (for duration and GFP) for both questionnaire scores.
These were performed for the whole sample, using Pearson
product moment correlations. All p-values are two-tailed, and the
significance level was set to a=0.05.
Source localization
The neural generators for a given mean EP map were estimated
by using a distributed linear inverse solution, based on a local
auto-regressive average (LAURA) model [41]. LAURA selects the
source configuration that tries to mimic the biophysical behavior
of electric vector fields (i.e., activity at one point depends on the
activity at neighboring points according to electromagnetic laws).
The solution space was calculated on a realistic head model that
included 4024 nodes, selected from a 66666 mm-grid equally
distributed within the gray matter of the Montreal Neurological
Institute’s average brain.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: SA CM OB. Performed the
experiments: SA SM IMZ. Analyzed the data: SA CM OB. Contributed
reagents/materials/analysis tools: OB. Wrote the paper: SA CM IMZ OB.
References
1. Buckner RL, Carroll DC (2007) Self-projection and the brain. Trends Cogn Sci
11: 49–57.
2. Arzy S, Adi-Japha E, Blanke O (2009) The mental time line: An analogue of the
mental number line in the mapping of life events. Conscious Cogn.
3. Arzy S, Molnar-Szakacs I, Blanke O (2008) Self in time: imagined self-location
influences neural activity related to mental time travel. J Neurosci 28:
6502–6507.
4. Squire LR, Stark CE, Clark RE (2004) The medial temporal lobe. Annu Rev
Neurosci 27: 279–306.
5. Bar M (2007) The proactive brain: using analogies and associations to generate
predictions. Trends Cogn Sci 11: 280–289.
6. Atance CM, O’Neill DK (2001) Episodic future thinking. Trends Cogn Sci 5:
533–539.
7. Addis DR, Wong AT, Schacter DL (2007) Remembering the past and imagining
the future: Common and distinct neural substrates during event construction
and elaboration. Neuropsychologia 45: 1363–1377.
8. Tulving E (2002) Episodic memory: from mind to brain. Annu Rev Psychol 53:
1–25.
9. Baars B (1997) In the Theater of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University
Press.
10. Maguire EA, Burgess N, Donnett JG, Frackowiak RS, Frith CD, et al. (1998)
Knowing where and getting there: a human navigation network. Science 280:
921–924.
11. Ruby P, Decety J (2001) Effect of subjective perspective taking during simulation
of action: a PET investigation of agency. Nat Neurosci 4: 546–550.
12. Vogeley K, Fink GR (2003) Neural correlates of the first-person-perspective.
Trends Cogn Sci 7: 38–42.
13. Zacks J, Rypma B, Gabrieli JD, Tversky B, Glover GH (1999) Imagined
transformationsofbodies:anfMRIinvestigation.Neuropsychologia37:1029–1040.
14. Bueti D, Walsh V (2009) The parietal cortex and the representation of time,
space, number and other magnitudes. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 364:
1831–1840.
15. Walsh V (2003) Cognitive neuroscience: numerate neurons. Curr Biol 13:
R447–448.
16. Frith C (1996) Neuropsychology of schizophrenia, what are the implications of
intellectual and experiential abnormalities for the neurobiology of schizophre-
nia? Br Med Bull 52: 618–626.
17. Frith CD, Corcoran R (1996) Exploring ‘theory of mind’ in people with
schizophrenia. Psychol Med 26: 521–530.
18. Angyal A (1936) The experience of the body-self in schizophrenia. Arch Neurol
Psychiatry 35: 1029–1053.
19. Blakemore SJ, Smith J, Steel R, Johnstone CE, Frith CD (2000) The perception
of self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and
passivity experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring. Psychol Med
30: 1131–1139.
20. Langdon R, Coltheart M (1999) Mentalising, schizotypy, and schizophrenia.
Cognition 71: 43–71.
21. Lenzenweger MF (2000) Two-point discrimination thresholds and schizotypy:
illuminating a somatosensory dysfunction. Schizophr Res 42: 111–124.
22. Platek SM, Gallup GG, Jr. (2002) Self-face recognition is affected by schizotypal
personality traits. Schizophr Res 57: 81–85.
23. Vogeley K, Kupke C (2007) Disturbances of time consciousness from a
phenomenological and a neuroscientific perspective. Schizophr Bull 33:
157–165.
24. Farrer C, Franck N, Frith CD, Decety J, Georgieff N, et al. (2004) Neural
correlates of action attribution in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res 131: 31–44.
25. Mohr C, Blanke O, Brugger P (2006) Perceptual aberrations impair mental own-
body transformations. Behav Neurosci 120: 528–534.
26. Wible CG, Preus AP, Hashimoto R (2009) A Cognitive Neuroscience View of
Schizophrenic Symptoms: Abnormal Activation of a System for Social
Perception and Communication. Brain Imaging Behav 3: 85–110.
27. Chapman LJ, Chapman JP, Raulin ML (1978) Body-image aberration in
Schizophrenia. J Abnorm Psychol 87: 399–407.
Schizotypal Perceptual Aberrations of Time
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e1615428. Tallent KA, Gooding DC (1999) Working memory and Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test performance in schizotypic individuals: a replication and extension.
Psychiatry Res 89: 161–170.
29. Chapman LJ, Chapman JP, Kwapil TR, Eckblad M, Zinser MC (1994)
Putatively psychosis-prone subjects 10 years later. J Abnorm Psychol 103:
171–183.
30. Lenzenweger MF (1994) Psychometric high-risk paradigm, perceptual aberra-
tions, and schizotypy: an update. Schizophr Bull 20: 121–135.
31. Arzy S, Mohr C, Michel CM, Blanke O (2007) Duration and not strength of
activation in temporo-parietal cortex positively correlates with schizotypy.
Neuroimage 35: 326–333.
32. Farrer C, Frith CD (2002) Experiencing oneself vs another person as being the
cause of an action: the neural correlates of the experience of agency.
Neuroimage 15: 596–603.
33. Franck N, O’Leary DS, Flaum M, Hichwa RD, Andreasen NC (2002) Cerebral
blood flow changes associated with Schneiderian first-rank symptoms in
schizophrenia. J Neuropsychiatry Clin Neurosci 14: 277–282.
34. Ganesan V, Hunter MD, Spence SA (2005) Schneiderian first-rank symptoms
and right parietal hyperactivation: a replication using FMRI. Am J Psychiatry
162: 1545.
35. Tendolkar I, Ruhrmann S, Brockhaus A, Pukrop R, Klosterkotter J (2002)
Remembering or knowing: electrophysiological evidence for an episodic
memory deficit in schizophrenia. Psychol Med 32: 1261–1271.
36. D’Argembeau A, Raffard S, Van der Linden M (2008) Remembering the past
and imagining the future in schizophrenia. J Abnorm Psychol 117: 247–251.
37. Strathman A, Gleicher F, Boninger DS, Edwards CS (1994) The consideration
of future consequences: weighing immediate and distant outcomes of behavior.
Journal of personality and social psychology 66: 742–752.
38. Zimbardo PG, Boyd JN (1999) Putting time in perspective: A valid, reliable
individual differences metric. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77:
1271–1288.
39. Carlson EB, Putnam FW, Ross CA, Torem M, Coons P, et al. (1993) Validity of
the Dissociative Experiences Scale in screening for multiple personality disorder:
a multicenter study. Am J Psychiatry 150: 1030–1036.
40. Arzy S, Collette S, Ionta S, Fornari E, Blanke O (2009) Subjective mental time:
the functional architecture of projecting the self to past and future. Eur J Neurosci
30: 2009–2017.
41. Grave de Peralta Menendez R, Murray MM, Michel CM, Martuzzi R,
Gonzalez Andino SL (2004) Electrical neuroimaging based on biophysical
constraints. Neuroimage 21: 527–539.
42. Bleuler E (1911) Dementia Praecox or the group of the Schizophrenias. New
York: International University Press.
43. Langdon R, Coltheart M (2001) Visual perspective-taking and schizotypy:
evidence for a simulation-based account of mentalizing in normal adults.
Cognition 82: 1–26.
44. Gallup GG, Jr., Anderson JR, Platek SM (2003) Self-awareness, social
intelligence, and schizophrenia. In: Kircher TT, David S, eds. The Self and
schizophrenia: A neuropsychological perspective. Cambridge, UK: The Self and
schizophrenia: A neuropsychological perspective.
45. Lindner A, Thier P, Kircher TT, Haarmeier T, Leube DT (2005) Disorders of
agency in schizophrenia correlate with an inability to compensate for the sensory
consequences of actions. Curr Biol 15: 1119–1124.
46. Bourdet C, Brochard R, Rouillon F, Drake C (2003) Auditory temporal
processing in schizophrenia: high level rather than low level deficits? Cognit
Neuropsychiatry 8: 89–106.
47. Cellard C, Tremblay S, Lehoux C, Roy MA (2007) Processing spatial-temporal
information in recent-onset schizophrenia: the study of short-term memory and
its susceptibility to distraction. Brain Cogn 64: 201–207.
48. Davalos DB, Kisley MA, Freedman R (2005) Behavioral and electrophysiolog-
ical indices of temporal processing dysfunction in schizophrenia.
J Neuropsychiatry Clin Neurosci 17: 517–525.
49. Davalos DB, Kisley MA, Ross RG (2003) Effects of interval duration on
temporal processing in schizophrenia. Brain Cogn 52: 295–301.
50. Lhamon WT, Goldstone S (1973) Temporal information processing in
schizophrenia. Arch Gen Psychiatry 28: 44–51.
51. Carroll CA, Boggs J, O’Donnell BF, Shekhar A, Hetrick WP (2008) Temporal
processing dysfunction in schizophrenia. Brain Cogn 67: 150–161.
52. Varela FJ (1999) The specious present: A neurophenomenology of time
consciousness. In: Petitot J, Varela FJ, Pachoud B, Roy J-M, eds. Naturalizing
Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive
Science Standford. CA: Stanford University Press.
53. Tulving E (1985) Memory and consciousness. Can Psychol 26: 1–12.
54. Danion JM, Rizzo L, Bruant A (1999) Functional mechanisms underlying
impaired recognition memory and conscious awareness in patients with
schizophrenia. Arch Gen Psychiatry 56: 639–644.
55. Danion JM, Huron C, Vidailhet P, Berna F (2007) Functional mechanisms of
episodic memory impairment in schizophrenia. Can J Psychiatry 52: 693–701.
56. Boyer P, Phillips JL, Rousseau FL, Ilivitsky S (2007) Hippocampal abnormalities
and memory deficits: new evidence of a strong pathophysiological link in
schizophrenia. Brain Res Rev 54: 92–112.
57. Feinstein A, Goldberg TE, Nowlin B, Weinberger DR (1998) Types and
characteristics of remote memory impairment in schizophrenia. Schizophr Res
30: 155–163.
58. Ragland JD, Gur RC, Valdez J, Turetsky BI, Elliott M, et al. (2004) Event-
related fMRI of frontotemporal activity during word encoding and recognition
in schizophrenia. Am J Psychiatry 161: 1004–1015.
59. Ranganath C, Minzenberg MJ, Ragland JD (2008) The cognitive neuroscience
of memory function and dysfunction in schizophrenia. Biol Psychiatry 64:
18–25.
60. Frith C, Dolan R (1996) The role of the prefrontal cortex in higher cognitive
functions. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res 5: 175–181.
61. Spence SA, Brooks DJ, Hirsch SR, Liddle PF, Meehan J, et al. (1997) A PET
study of voluntary movement in schizophrenic patients experiencing passivity
phenomena (delusions of alien control). Brain 120(Pt 11): 1997–2011.
62. David O, Harrison L, Friston KJ (2005) Modelling event-related responses in the
brain. Neuroimage 25: 756–770.
63. Friston KJ (1996) Theoretical neurobiology and schizophrenia. Br Med Bull 52:
644–655.
64. Friston KJ, Frith CD (1995) Schizophrenia: a disconnection syndrome? Clin
Neurosci 3: 89–97.
65. Saito N, Kuginuki T, Yagyu T, Kinoshita T, Koenig T, et al. (1998) Global,
regional, and local measures of complexity of multichannel electroencephalog-
raphy in acute, neuroleptic-naive, first-break schizophrenics. Biol Psychiatry 43:
794–802.
66. Fox MD, Snyder AZ, Vincent JL, Corbetta M, Van Essen DC, et al. (2005) The
human brain is intrinsically organized into dynamic, anticorrelated functional
networks. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 102: 9673–9678.
67. Golland Y, Bentin S, Gelbard H, Benjamini Y, Heller R, et al. (2007) Extrinsic
and intrinsic systems in the posterior cortex of the human brain revealed during
natural sensory stimulation. Cereb Cortex 17: 766–777.
68. Gusnard DA, Akbudak E, Shulman GL, Raichle ME (2001) Medial prefrontal
cortex and self-referential mental activity: relation to a default mode of brain
function. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 98: 4259–4264.
69. Gusnard DA, Raichle ME, Raichle ME (2001) Searching for a baseline:
functional imaging and the resting human brain. Nat Rev Neurosci 2: 685–694.
70. Raichle ME, MacLeod AM, Snyder AZ, Powers WJ, Gusnard DA, et al. (2001)
A default mode of brain function. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 98: 676–682.
71. Arzy S, Arzouan Y, Adi-Japha E, Solomon S, Blanke O. The ‘intrinsic’ system in
the human cortex and self-projection: a data driven analysis. Neuroreport 21:
569–574.
72. Golland Y, Golland P, Bentin S, Malach R (2008) Data-driven clustering reveals
a fundamental subdivision of the human cortex into two global systems.
Neuropsychologia 46: 540–553.
73. Ingvar DH (1985) ‘‘Memory of the future’’: an essay on the temporal
organization of conscious awareness. Hum Neurobiol 4: 127–136.
74. Battelli L, Pascual-Leone A, Cavanagh P (2007) The ‘when’ pathway of the right
parietal lobe. Trends Cogn Sci 11: 204–210.
75. Battelli L, Walsh V, Pascual-Leone A, Cavanagh P (2008) The ‘when’ parietal
pathway explored by lesion studies. Curr Opin Neurobiol 18: 120–126.
76. Oldfield RC (1971) The assessment and analysis of handedness: the Edinburgh
inventory. Neuropsychologia 9: 97–113.
77. Lehmann D, Skrandies W (1980) Reference-free identification of components of
checkerboard-evoked multichannel potential fields. Electroencephalogr Clin
Neurophysiol 48: 609–621.
78. Michel CM, Murray MM, Lantz G, Gonzalez S, Spinelli L, et al. (2004) EEG
source imaging. Clin Neurophysiol 115: 2195–2222.
79. Michel CM, Thut G, Morand S, Khateb A, Pegna AJ, et al. (2001) Electric
source imaging of human brain functions. Brain Res Brain Res Rev 36:
108–118.
80. Murray MM, Brunet D, Michel CM (2008) Topographic ERP analyses: a step-
by-step tutorial review. Brain Topogr 20: 249–264.
81. Lehmann D, Skrandies W (1984) Spatial analysis of evoked potentials in man—a
review. Prog Neurobiol 23: 227–250.
82. Brandeis D, Lehmann D (1986) Event-related potentials of the brain and
cognitive processes: approaches and applications. Neuropsychologia 24:
151–168.
83. Pascual-Marqui RD, Michel CM, Lehmann D (1995) Segmentation of brain
electrical activity into microstates: model estimation and validation. IEEE Trans
Biomed Eng 42: 658–665.
Schizotypal Perceptual Aberrations of Time
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e16154